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Abstract 
In Homo sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Giorgio Agamben extends Michel 
Foucault’s notion of biopolitics to include life, stripped bare, that is placed 
completely at the mercy of the powers that be. For him, the biopolitical paradigm 
is no longer the asylum but the concentration camp. Agamben drew the 
inspiration for this shift from Walter Benjamin, who decades ago had observed 
that the state of exception favored by the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt had become the 
rule. Certain strata of the population, in this case the Jewish citizens in Germany, 
were abandoned by the law while continuing to fall under its control. Agamben 
examines the extent to which Aristotle gave support to this murderous logic with 
his considerations on “potentiality to be” and “potentiality not to be.” It is by 
suspending its “potentiality not to be” (that is, all elements that thwart its self-
affirmation) that absolute Being founds itself. In addition, Agamben dwells on 
Pompeius Festus’s definition of the outlaw (homo sacer): the one who cannot be 
sacrificed but who can be killed with impunity. The article concludes with a 
sketch of the figure of the Messiah (equally borrowed from Benjamin) who is 
expected to reverse the logic of the law. 
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iorgio Agamben (1942–) is an Italian philosopher whose work has 
received attention worldwide since the events of September 11, 2001, 
when two commercial aircrafts were commandeered by terrorists and flown 
directly into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. 
The reaction of the US government against this terrorist act, of drastically 
boosting its national security, has led to restrictions on civil liberties 
worldwide. The way in which governments have resorted to emergency 
measures forms the leitmotif of Agamben’s major work, Homo Sacer: Sovereign 
Power and Bare Life (1995).1 In this work, he examines the mechanisms that 
Nazi Germany used to exterminate the Jews. His analysis of the “state of 
exception”—his term for political and social exclusion—is so fundamental 
that it easily lends itself to the analysis of contemporary case studies of 
dehumanization. 
Unlike political philosophers, such as Habermas, who optimistically 
continue to believe in the success of democratically conducted deliberations 
in parliamentary regimes, Agamben is rather alert to the infiltration of 
totalitarian features in contemporary democracies. For him, even allegedly 
democratic states are plagued with the growing exercise of sovereign power. 
In a great many nation-states, presidents and prime ministers (and their 
immediate collaborators) increasingly tend to make decisions that defy any 
democratic rule and even turn out to clash with the most basic principles of 
the nation’s constitution. Think of George W. Bush’s decision to establish a 
detention camp in Guantanamo Bay (a US enclave in Cuba), outside US legal 
jurisdiction, for the purpose of prosecuting prisoners, who are accorded no 
legal status whatsoever, for war crimes. Agamben terms this kind of power 
“sovereign power,” because it is accountable to no one, not even to the 
constitution of the state in whose name the sovereign exercises his power. 
 
 
 
1
 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1995; Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1998). 
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The Concentration Camp as a New Paradigm 
In putting forward this thesis, Agamben takes his lead—although from 
different angles—from the French postmodern philosopher Michel Foucault 
(1926–1984), and the German jurist and political theorist Carl Schmitt 
(1888–1985). From Foucault, he assimilated the basic idea that, since the 
modern era, the European states have been engaging in “biopolitics,” that is, 
in political strategies designed to enhance the biological vitality of the 
population through the promotion of hygiene and discipline and the 
eradication of (mental) diseases. As a result, private life in the household was 
subjected to control and surveillance. For Foucault, the symbol that best 
expresses this encompassing interference of the state in private life is the 
asylum, the exemplary place where inmates are re-educated so as to adopt 
“rational” conduct. From Schmitt, the Nazi jurist (who was acquainted with 
Hitler’s program of eugenics and racial purity), Agamben learned the efficacy 
of the “state of exception” for discriminating against certain strata of the 
population. This measure enables the sovereign to suspend the law—and so 
also part of the citizens’ civil liberties—in cases of emergency: “Sovereign,” 
wrote Schmitt, “is he who decides on the state of exception.”2 The 
combination of both approaches allows Agamben to articulate a state of 
affairs in which the sovereign ruler decides on the life and death of his 
subordinates, whose bare lives are completely at his mercy. Hence the title of 
his book: Homo Sacer [The Outlaw]: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 
In Agamben’s reading, Foucault and Schmitt in a sense complete each 
other. On the one hand, he welcomes the fact that Foucault abandons “the 
traditional approach to the problem of power, which is based on juridico-
institutional models (the definition of sovereignty, the definition of the 
State), in favor of an unprejudiced analysis of the concrete ways in which  
 
 
 
 
2
 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1985); quoted in Agamben, Homo Sacer, 11.   
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power penetrates subjects’ very bodies and forms of life.”3 If you want to  
know how power works, look at the impact it has on people’s lives. On the 
other hand, he sought to grasp the very mechanism through which the 
sovereign legislator succeeds in making the law’s power penetrate his 
subjects’ bare life. He found this mechanism in Carl Schmitt’s legitimization 
of the “state of exception,” which, on close inspection, reduces a number of 
people to the awful position of being “outlaws”: those who enjoy no status 
under the law so that they are accorded no rights whatsoever and can thus be 
killed, exterminated, with impunity. Agamben actually had reasons enough to 
presume that Schmitt, the Nazi jurist, was perfectly well acquainted with the 
horrible slaughter of innocent people that his juridical theories were used to 
justify. When looking for a paradigmatic example to illustrate this situation, 
Agamben’s option is clear: the Nazi concentration camp. The concentration 
camp, much better than Foucault’s asylum, evokes what is at stake in 
modern biopolitics. The reader will not be surprised to learn that Part Three 
of Agamben’s book is entitled: “The Camp as Biopolitical Paradigm of the 
Modern.”4  
For the purpose of my inquiry, a correct juridical understanding of the 
“outcast” or the “outlaw” (homo sacer) is imperative. Etymologically, the 
English term “outlaw” might suggest that the person in question is no longer 
part of the juridical system (“he is outside the law”), but this is not really the 
case. S/he continues to belong to the juridical system, as the one who is abandoned by it 
(i.e., deprived of legal protection). This allows the juridical system to continue to control the 
forms of life of the abandoned, who remain at its mercy. Moreover, the paradoxical 
situation of abandonment and control could gradually be staged. The Jews in 
Nazi Germany were, in a first move, deprived of their German citizenship by 
decree—so, they lost the right to teach at German universities or to practice 
their professions as physicians, lawyers, or judges, and intermarriage between  
 
 
 
 
3 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 5. 
4 Ibid., 117. 
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Jews and Germans automatically became illegal (all realities subject to state  
control and intervention). In a further move, they were forbidden from 
entering pubs, restaurants, and parks (to facilitate control, they were required  
to wear the yellow star of David). Finally, their properties were confiscated 
(they had to live in gated ghettos like that of Warsaw in occupied Poland), 
etc. In short, the ones who are “excluded” remain “within” the system, under the 
surveillance of the police state. 
For Agamben, this is the paradox and secret mystery of the “state of 
exception” (and of exclusion): the victims are “taken outside” and yet “stay 
within.” The concentration camp is a case in point: “The paradoxical status 
of the camp as a space of exception,” he wrote, “must be considered. The 
camp is a piece of land placed outside the normal juridical order, but it is 
nevertheless not simply an external space. What is excluded in the camp is, 
according to the etymological sense of the term ‘exception’ (ex-capere), taken 
outside, included through its own exclusion.”5 Agamben makes it clear that the 
more the “state of exception” is “willed”—as this was manifest in the erection of the 
camp—the more the norm becomes indistinguishable from the exception. The “state of 
exception” begins, in other words, to be regarded as the rule. In Agamben’s view, not 
only totalitarian states, like Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia, but also 
respected democratic states, like the United States, eventually find it quite 
normal to regularly issue a “state of emergency” by reason of which certain 
civil rights are suspended. In Nazi Germany, the Jews lost their civil and 
human rights because of a “state of emergency”: the urgent and massive 
defense of the (threatened) purity and superiority of the German race. In the 
United States, a similar “state of emergency” was issued after 9/11: in it the 
American citizens lost their right to privacy, for the sake of assuring national 
security in times of terror.  
Agamben is renowned for his meticulous study of the history of ideas: his 
erudition covers the whole Graeco-Roman civilization and the entire 
development of European philosophy and jurisprudence. It is no wonder  
 
 
 
5 Ibid., 169–70. 
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that in his book, he seeks to lay bare the implicit or pertinent presence, in a 
selection of classic texts of Western thought, of his central theme of 
“sovereignty as power over life and death.” His research falls into two parts: 
“sovereign power and violence,” and “homo sacer,” the outlaw who can be 
killed with impunity. I will treat both aspects separately. 
Sovereign Power and Violence 
For Agamben, the logic of sovereignty discloses itself in the violent 
character of the law. This feature had already been tackled by the German 
Jewish philosopher Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) in his essay “Critique of 
Violence” (1921). In this essay, Benjamin attempted to draw a distinction 
between “violence that posits the law” (a violence that flows from the 
revolutionary establishment of a new regime) and “violence that preserves 
the law” (violence inherent in the enforcement of the law). As a matter of 
fact, he had expected to find out that in the latter case the use of violence 
would be considerably lessened, but this expectation turned out to be flawed: 
in the police state that the German Weimar Republic had become in his 
days, the police enforced the law with ever increasing brutality.  
Intrigued by the result of Benjamin’s study, Agamben set out to examine 
how the enforcement of the law was experienced in Ancient Greece. A 
poem by Pindar (518–438 BC) portrayed the sovereign law as “leading with 
the strongest hand; justifying the most violent,” thus providing “the hidden 
paradigm guiding every successive definition of sovereignty: the sovereign is 
the point of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which 
violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence.”6 Plato 
(427–347 BC) disagreed with this view. For him, Pindar might have been 
correct in imagining how a tyrant enforces the law, but he certainly was 
wrong when suggesting that violence belongs to the essence of the legal 
system whose primary task is precisely to ban violence. 
 
 
6 Ibid., 31–32. 
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With this nuance, Plato intended to counter the Sophists, who justified 
the violence of the strongest as a natural given. Yet, Agamben observes, it is 
evident that the course of history took the other direction. The Sophists’ 
thesis was retrieved (and modified) by Hobbes (1588–1657), whose political 
philosophy commences with the initial state of “war of all against all.” This 
situation, though, drastically changes with the advent of the sovereign “who 
is the only one to preserve its natural jus contra omnes,”7 i.e., his natural right to 
combat all the others. Indeed, on the basis of a social contract, the citizens 
had consigned their natural right to violence to the sovereign. A great many 
commentators have come to see in this transmission of power the beginning 
of a peaceful society. But not Agamben. For him, the sovereign possesses 
plenipotentiary powers. It is up to him to maintain law and order. But it is 
equally up to him to decide the extent to which law and order will be 
enforced with violence (a violence that, as such, is part of the state of 
nature). In Agamben’s words: “Sovereignty thus presents itself as an 
incorporation of the state of nature in society, or, if one prefers, as a state of 
indistinction between nature and culture, between violence and law, and this 
very indistinction constitutes specifically sovereign violence.”8  
The inclusion of the violent “state of nature” in the person of the 
sovereign allows us to understand the phenomenon of the “state of 
exception,” which is nothing other than the willed relapse into the violent 
“state of nature.” In it, the sovereign suspends any form of legal protection, so that the 
“outlaw” is exposed now to the chaotic assaults of violence that existed before the emergence 
of the social contract. The crucial question to be asked at this juncture, however, 
is what exactly motivated the sovereign to thrust the “outlaw” into a state of 
abandonment? In order to answer this question, Agamben revisits Aristotle’s 
definition of the way in which actuality relates to potentiality, a definition  
that “actually bequeathed the paradigm of sovereignty to Western  
 
 
 
7 Ibid., 35. 
8 Ibid. 
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philosophy.”9 First of all, he observes that for Aristotle (384–322 BC), 
potentiality has a double face: it can appear as “potentiality to be” but also as 
“potentiality not to be.” Agamben then explains how Sovereign Being 
juggles with this double meaning: it is by suspending its “potentiality not to 
be” that Sovereign Being ascertains its limitless sovereignty. The suspension 
of its ability not to be grounds the sovereign power of Sovereign Being. He 
writes: “Potentiality (in its double appearances as potentiality to and as 
potentiality not to) is that through which Being founds itself sovereignly, which is 
to say, without anything preceding or determining it . . . other than its own 
ability not to be. And an act is sovereign when it realizes itself by simply 
taking away its potentiality not to be, letting itself be, giving itself to itself.”10 
This process of “giving itself to itself” results in the concept of an 
Absolute Being that incessantly brings itself forth in a sovereign way: it is 
only this self-grounding that interests it. In terms of politics, this means that 
the sovereign is incessantly caught up in a process of having to rearticulate 
his/her existence: “[Sovereignty] is what always already is, as well as what has 
yet to be realized; it is the pure source of identity and yet”—and here enters 
the notion of exclusion—“it has to redefine and purify itself continuously 
according to exclusion, language, blood and territory.”11 Exceptions and 
exclusions continue to define the space of political activity, just as they define 
the self-grounding of Being. Indeed, just as “Being, as potentiality, suspends 
itself, maintaining itself in a relation of ban (or abandonment) with itself in 
order to realize itself as absolute actuality,”12 so, too, Being suspends and 
maintains itself in a relation of abandonment with (external) elements that might 
threaten the realization of its absolute actuality. These elements must be  
 
 
 
 
 
9 Ibid., 46. 
10 Ibid. 
11
 Giorgio Agamben, Means without Ends: Notes on Politics (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2003), 32. 
12 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 47. Italics mine. 
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discarded and excluded for the sake of the self-grounding of Being, and, in 
the space of political activity, for the sake of self-grounding of sovereign 
power. 
Criticism of Western Metaphysics 
It will not have escaped the attention of the reader that with his analysis 
of Aristotle, Agamben reconstructed a system that justifies both sovereign 
power and the mechanisms of exclusion flowing from it. With this 
reconstruction, he intends to criticize Carl Schmitt and the “state of 
exception” that played such a pivotal role in Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology: 
Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. According to Schmitt, “all significant 
concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological 
concepts,”13 that is, they all display a remainder of the inviolability of the 
sacred. With this inviolability, Schmitt sought to give a justification to his 
juridical theories as well as to the exclusions they contain. Agamben is fully 
aware of the catastrophic outcome of such a “theological” justification, and 
is determined to do away with it. In this undertaking, he collaborates with 
Heidegger’s deconstruction of onto-theology.  
Onto-theology is a “metaphysics of Being” that takes its point of 
departure in the Highest Being, the sovereign God. Separate beings are 
supposed to acquire their value and consistency from their dependency on 
the Highest Being that is the ground of all that exists. In the vein of 
Heidegger (1889–1976)14 he blames the onto-theology of Western 
metaphysics for having developed a ruthless philosophy of dominance. But, 
whereas Heidegger elaborated this assessment in terms of a critique of 
Western technology, Agamben focuses on the political implications of 
sovereign power. That is why he is able to bring up the scandal of the  
 
 
 
13 Schmitt, Political Theology, 35; quoted in Giorgio Agamben, The Power and the Glory, iBook ed. 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 34. 
14 In 1966 and 1968, Agamben studied with Heidegger in France, when near the end of his 
life, Heidegger held seminars in the town of Le Thor. 
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German concentration camps, which Heidegger never critically exposed as a 
political fact. The only text in which Heidegger mentions the death camps is 
a statement from 1949, three years after the end of the Second World War. 
There he says, “Agriculture is now a mechanized food industry, in essence it 
is no different than the production of corpses in the gas chambers,”15 a 
statement that displays a concern about technical mechanization much more 
than about the Jews’ extermination through political maneuvers of exclusion. 
It is worth noting that the postmodern deconstructionist Jacques Derrida 
(1930–2004) also made it clear that logocentrism, his term for onto-theology, 
inevitably leads to a system of oppositions and exclusions.16 Yet, more 
explicitly than Derrida, Agamben succeeds in giving a clearly political 
content to such exclusions, precisely by demonstrating the strict parallel 
between the Aristotelian self-grounding of Being which needs exclusions and 
abandonments in order to achieve its full actualization, and the—equally self-
grounding—exclusions wrought by the sovereign in the political realm.  
If one were to ask the question as to how he came to draw this 
parallelism, the answer is apparent: because of his obsession with Carl 
Schmitt, an obsession he shared with Walter Benjamin (whose remaining 
unedited texts he published and translated into Italian). Agamben was 
shocked by the manner in which Schmitt used the “state of exception” 
(exclusion) as an explanatory category for elucidating the impact of sovereign 
power. For Schmitt, “The exception explains the general and itself. And 
when one really wants to study the general, one need only look around for a 
real exception.”17 So, if you want to know how sovereignty works in all its cruelty, look 
at those whom it pitilessly expels: the excluded. Each reality elucidates the other: the 
killing of the outlaw is the logical consequence of the ruthless self-grounding 
of Being. 
 
 
15
 Wolfgang Schirmacher, Technik und Gelassenheit: Zeitkritik nach Heidegger (Freiburg: Alber, 
1984), 25. 
16
 See Georges De Schrijver, The Political Ethics of Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques Derrida 
(Leuven, Paris, and Walpole, MA: Peeters, 2010), 222. 
17 Schmitt, Political Theology, 22; quoted in Agamben, Homo Sacer, 16. 
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Homo Sacer: The Outlaw 
Agamben initially planned to confine his polemics with Schmitt to the 
question of sovereignty. But the more he laid bare its procedures, the more it 
dawned upon him that he also had to dwell on the victims of sovereign 
exclusion. The prototype of exclusion is, for him, homo sacer, the outlaw. 
Agamben leaves the Latin term homo sacer untranslated. This may be 
confusing to a great many of his readers, since they associate the “holy man” 
(homo sacer) with a person having a higher vocation: with the one who 
dedicated his existence to God. The original meaning of “sacer,” however, is 
the “one who is set apart”: the segregated, a meaning that is further qualified 
depending on the specific context. In a religious context, homo sacer is the one 
who has abandoned profane existence: the holy person who becomes the 
object of admiration. But in a juridical context, homo sacer is the one who is 
abandoned by the law, the outcast, the bandit to be treated as a criminal, the 
cursed and banned outlaw. This is the meaning Agamben discovered in 
Roman juridical texts, and which became his favored understanding of the 
term. According to the juridical understanding, the person who breaks his 
oath, or the maecenas (Godfather) who deceives his protégés and clients, is a 
criminal that ought to be banned: “Sacer esto (you may be banned) is in fact a 
curse, and homo sacer on whom this curse falls is an outcast, a banned man.”18 
Agamben takes his lead from the definition of homo sacer given by 
Pompeius Festus (1st century BC) in his treatise On the Significance of Words. 
This definition reads as follows: “The sacred man is the one whom the 
people have judged on account of a crime. It is not permitted to sacrifice this 
man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide.”19 The 
question is, of course, how one is to understand this enigmatic statement. 
That the statement appears enigmatic to us is evident from the divergent 
interpretations of the phenomenon. Specialists in jurisprudence opine that  
 
 
 
18 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 79. 
19 Ibid., 71. 
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we have to do with an archaic penal law in which the death penalty was seen 
as a consecration of the victim to the gods of the underworld. For them, it is 
evident that the person in question can be killed with impunity, but they are 
unable to explain the veto on sacrifice mentioned by Festus, because for 
them the killing is, in the archaic mentality, already a sacred act (sacratio). 
Specialists in ethnology, on the contrary, focus on the notion of taboo and 
on the ambivalent character of the damned, who was felt to be both worthy 
of veneration and as provoking horror—qualities associated with the sacred. 
For them, homo sacer cannot be sacrificed because he is already possessed by 
the gods. But they have difficulties in explaining why that person can still be 
killed (with impunity). Those who would kill a sacred person by this very act 
render themselves religiously impure. 
For Agamben, both interpretations have their shortcomings because they 
are unduly influenced by rather recent studies that place the ambivalent 
character of the sacred into the limelight—consider, for instance, Rudolf 
Otto’s (1869–1937) famous characterization of the sacred as the awe-
inspiring, fascinating mystery (mysterium tremendum et fascinosum). Agamben is 
fully aware of the fact that ancient cultures associate feelings of inviolability 
and sacredness, or purity and impurity, with certain juridical and political 
facts. But he wants to stress that all that is being said about homo sacer belongs 
in the first place to the political sphere: “The syntagma homo sacer names 
something like the ‘originally’ political relation,” that it is to say, “the 
inclusion of bare life in the juridical order . . . . Sacer esto is the originary 
political formulation of the imposition of the sovereign bond.”20 
Festus’s definition of homo sacer can only properly be understood if one 
pays attention to the double exclusion to which it alludes. Homo sacer can be 
killed with impunity because he is excluded (ex-cepted) from the natural 
order of the human community; yet, his killing cannot be qualified as a 
sacrifice to the gods, because he is equally excluded (ex-cepted) from the  
 
 
 
 
20 Ibid., 85. 
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divine order. Homo sacer is abandoned both by the human community and by 
the gods. In Agamben’s words: “It has been observed that while consecratio 
normally brings an object from the ius humanum to the ius divinum, from the 
profane to the sacred, in the case of homo sacer a person is simply set outside 
human jurisdiction without being brought into the realm of divine law . . . . 
If this is true, then sacratio takes the form of a double exception, both from 
the ius humanum and from the ius divinum, both from the sphere of the 
profane and from that of the religious.”21 
Bare Life 
These considerations prepare us to understand the unusual and shocking 
term “bare life” (la nuda vita in Italian). Agamben borrows the term from 
Walter Benjamin, for whom the expression “das blosse Leben” indicates the 
defenseless denudation to which our lives will be exposed as soon as the 
state of exception becomes the rule. “Bare life” is a life bereft of legal 
protection, and which for this reason finds itself in the liminal space between 
life and death. In Agamben’s words: homo sacer, the outcast, “has been 
excluded from the religious community and from all political life: he cannot 
participate in the rites of the gens, nor . . . can he perform any juridically valid 
act. What is more, his entire existence is reduced to a bare life stripped of 
every right by virtue of the fact that anyone can kill him without committing 
homicide; he can save himself only in perpetual flight or a foreign land. And 
yet, he is in a continuous relationship with the power that banished him 
precisely insofar as he is at every instant exposed to an unconditional threat 
of death.”22  
The more somebody is exposed to the logic of sovereign violence, the 
more he/she, as if brainwashed, will be convinced that his/her life is 
worthless and that the reigning powers also regard it as a “life devoid of  
 
 
 
 
21 Ibid., 82. 
22 Ibid., 183. 
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value.” The jurists in Nazi Germany justified their extermination of the Jews 
by decreeing that “theirs was a life unworthy of being lived” (lebensunwertes 
Leben); Hitler even dared to declare that the Jews were lice that must be 
trampled. Facing up to these facts, Agamben brings up again the question 
Walter Benjamin years ago raised about the “sacredness of life.” He right 
from the start observes that the contemporary notion of “sacredness of life” 
(appealed to in protests against atrocities of totalitarian regimes) was totally 
absent in Greek and Latin thought. Instead, life—ordinary, bare life—was 
seen as entirely at the mercy of the sovereign powers that be. He writes: 
“The sacredness of life, which is invoked today as an absolutely fundamental 
right in opposition to sovereign power, in fact originally expresses precisely 
both life’s subjection to a power over death and life’s irreparable exposure in 
the relation of abandonment.”23 Within the ambit of sovereign power, life is 
“sacred” because of its “consecration” not just to the destiny of death, as 
Heidegger would have it, but to the pending risks of being slaughtered with 
impunity.  
Instead of being inviolable, life for the victims of exclusion appears as 
“worthless.” Stripped of all value, they are treated with disdain, as 
“subhuman,” as “nonpersons.” Agamben refers to “the stadium in Bari into 
which the Italian police in 1991 provisionally herded illegal Albanian 
immigrants before sending them back to their country”; as well as to the 
“zones d’attentes in French international airports in which foreigners asking for 
refugee status are detained.”24 He could equally have mentioned the massive 
ethnic cleansings that took place in Bosnia and in Rwanda, or the tragic 
destiny of so many African shipwreck migrants around Lampedusa, who, 
when their overcrowded ships capsize, are not given any help. In all these 
cases, the specter of the concentration camp looms as the place of 
extermination and death. But the banalization of life also becomes visible  
elsewhere—in the thousands and thousands of victims of car accidents on  
 
 
 
23 Ibid., 83. 
24 Ibid., 174. 
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our highways: “Our age is the one in which a holiday weekend produces 
more victims on Europe’s highways than a war campaign.”25 To the extent 
that biopolitics or, better, thanatopolitics has a growing impact on our lives, 
all of us, Agamben predicts, are in one or another way gradually being 
reduced to worthless lives: “If today there is no longer any one clear figure 
of the sacred man, we all are virtually homines sacri.”26  
To summarize, Giorgio Agamben sought to take the work of Michel 
Foucault and build upon it. He extended the latter’s notion of biopolitics 
from a life disciplined by political interference to include bare life declared 
worthless by sovereign power. For him, the biopolitical paradigm is no 
longer the asylum but the concentration camp. The figure that inspired 
him to this paradigm shift is, without doubt, the German Jewish 
philosopher Walter Benjamin, who as a refugee from Nazi Germany 
committed suicide in 1940 at the border between France and Spain, for 
fear that he might end up in a concentration camp. Prior to this, Benjamin 
witnessed the rise in Germany of the Nazi regime as well as the many 
measures of exclusion imposed upon the Jewish community. This 
occasioned him to reflect on the logic of sovereign power and to write 
about it. Agamben knows Benjamin’s works as nobody else does. Taking 
his lead from them, and after the atrocities of the holocaust had become a 
fact, he published his book Homo Sacer, in which he developed in an 
original way the Aristotelian origin of the connection between sovereignty 
and exclusion, and linked this insight to what the grammarian Pompeius 
Festus had to say about homo sacer, the outcast. 
The Messianic Community 
Homo Sacer is not a pleasant book to read. The question that 
undoubtedly will arise is how it will ever be possible to escape the deadly 
grip of sovereign power? For this aspect, too, Benjamin will provide the  
 
 
 
25 Ibid., 114. 
26 Ibid., 115. 
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model. On the basis of his Jewish heritage, Walter Benjamin developed a 
theory of the messianic interruption that would invalidate the law. Giorgio 
Agamben will take up this idea and, in his specific learned style, develop 
what St. Paul and St. Francis of Assisi have to say about the messianic way 
of life.   
In The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life (Italian original 2011), 
Agamben stages a figure—the Franciscan friar and his enjoyment of bare 
life—that forms, so to speak, the antipode to the miserable “bare life” 
resulting from the exclusion/exception policies of sovereign power. For him, 
“the most precious legacy of Franciscanism to which the West must return 
ever anew to contend with it as its undeferrable task [is precisely] how to 
think a form-of-life, a human life entirely removed from the grasp of the law 
and a use of bodies and of the world that would never be substantiated into 
an appropriation. This is to say again: to think life as that which is never 
given as property but only as a common use.”27 The book is particularly 
interesting because it gives a detailed account of the struggle the Franciscans 
had to wage against the church hierarchy in order to have their “form-of-
life” recognized. This “form-of-life” consists in living a life without property 
rights, which in the last resort implies a life outside the law and its legal 
stipulations. Agamben meticulously follows the discussion, also as regards 
the distinction between the Conventuals and the Spirituals, up to the last 
detail. He finally welcomes the solution given by the Franciscan theologian 
Peter Olivi (1248–1298): the abdication of every right to property is the 
material precondition for living a life of “highest poverty,” but without the 
joyous commitment to making only “poor use” of things, this ideal is only 
negatively defined. It is precisely the joyous commitment to poverty that 
bestows a positive value to the Franciscan “form-of-life” beyond any 
reference to the law. And, Agamben concludes, with this positive depiction, 
the Franciscans were moving in the direction of the “theory of use present in 
 
27 Giorgio Agamben, The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life, iBook ed. (2011; 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 17. 
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the Pauline letters, in particular in 1 Corinthians 7:20–31, in which using the 
world as not using or not abusing it defined the Christian form of life.”28  
The reference to St. Paul is not random when one realizes that Agamben, 
from 1998 until 1999, gave a series of seminars in Paris and Berkeley on St. 
Paul’s Letter to the Romans, which lead to the publication of The Time That 
Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans (Italian original 2000). In this 
commentary, he took his inspiration from Walter Benjamin’s second thesis 
on the philosophy of history, in which Benjamin set out to conjure traces 
and images of “Messianic Time” which hold out the prospect of redeemed 
life: “The past,” the second thesis states, “carries with it a temporal index by 
which it is referred to redemption . . . . Like any generation that preceded us, 
we have been endowed with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the 
past has claim.”29 In other words, Benjamin felt the need to boost his weak 
Messianic power by revisiting the inspiring texts and images of his Jewish 
religious tradition. Agamben, will in a sense, do the same.  
Moreover, in his historical research on Benjamin, Agamben discovered 
that Benjamin’s source for the notion of “Messianic Time” was St. Paul. For 
St. Paul, “Messianic Time” is the ever given “now moment” (kairos) that 
compels the Messianic Community to live in the urgency of achieving the 
goal of resurrected life. For Agamben, it is evident: The good news St. Paul 
brought was the living presence, in the community, of Christ, the Messiah who deactivates 
the law by living a “form-of-life”—freed from the law—that renders the law inoperative. 
This ushers in an unexpectedly new perspective: the messianic community 
continues to live in the existing order, but under the proviso of the “as not” 
(hoos me), persuaded that the law has no longer any repressive claim on them, 
and that they themselves have no longer any right to property warranted by 
that law. As Agamben writers: “to be messianic, to live in the Messiah,  
signifies the expropriation (depropriazione) of each and every juridical-factical  
 
 
 
28 Ibid., 363. 
29
 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah 
Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1973), 254. 
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property (circumcised/uncircumcised; free/slave; man/woman) under the 
form of the as not.”30 Put differently: to be messianic means to exercise one’s human 
potential for development (technically: potentiality) without any orientation towards 
establishing power. Such a “weak” exercise of potentiality has, however, the 
capacity to demystify the logic of sovereignty—and exclusion—on which 
theories of the state are predicated. 
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